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I. Introduction1 
The current system of taxing the income of multinational firms in the United 
States is flawed across multiple dimensions.  The system provides an artificial tax 
incentive to earn income in low-tax countries, rewards aggressive tax planning, and is not 
compatible with any common metrics of efficiency.  The U.S. system is also notoriously 
complex;  observers are nearly unanimous in lamenting the heavy compliance burdens 
and the impracticality of coherent enforcement.  Further, despite a corporate tax rate one 
standard deviation above that of other OECD countries, the U.S. corporate tax system 
raises relatively little revenue, due in part to the shifting of income outside the U.S. tax 
base.  
In this proposal, we advocate moving to a system of formulary apportionment for 
taxing the corporate income of multinational firms.  Under our proposal, the U.S. tax base 
for multinational corporations would be calculated based on a fraction of their worldwide 
income.  This fraction would simply be the share of their worldwide sales that occur in 
the United States.  This system is similar to the current method that U.S. states use to 
allocate national income across states.2  The state system arose due to the widespread 
belief that it was impractical to account separately for what income is earned in each state 
when states are highly integrated economically.  Similarly, in an increasingly global 
world economy, it is difficult to assign profits to individual countries, and attempts to do 
so are fraught with opportunities for tax avoidance.  
                                                 
1 The authors acknowledge valuable feedback from Rosanne Altshuler, Mihir Desai, Jon Talisman, Michael 
Durst, Michael Knoll, Reed Schuldiner, Chris Sanchirico, Joann Weiner, Diane Ring, Yariv Brauner, 
Joseph Guttentag, Philip West, and the Hamilton Project staff, especially Peter Orszag, Jason Bordoff, and 
Michael Deich. 
2 We should note, however, that our proposal is significantly different from current state tax law, in ways 
discussed below.   
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Under our proposed formulary apportionment system, firms would no longer have 
an artificial tax incentive to shift income to low-tax locations.  This would help protect 
the U.S. tax base while reducing the distortionary features of the current tax system.  In 
addition, the complexity and administrative burden of the system would be reduced.  The 
proposed system would be both better suited to an integrated world economy and more 
compatible with the tax policy goals of efficiency, equity, and simplicity.   
The following section will discuss the current U.S. system and describe its flaws. 
Section III will describe our proposed formulary apportionment system, discuss its 
advantages, and clarify how the proposal addresses the flaws of the current system.  
Section IV will address potential hurdles and problems associated with formulary 
apportionment, including implementation issues.  Section V will conclude, briefly 
contrasting this proposal with other reform suggestions.   
 
II.  The U.S. System of Corporate Taxation 
 Under the current tax system, multinational firms (both resident and non-resident) 
pay tax to the U.S. government based on the income that they report earning in the United 
States.  As is typical, the United States employs a separate accounting (SA) system, 
where firms account for income and expenses in each country separately.  The current 
U.S. tax rate is 35 percent.  Figure 1A shows the evolution of corporate tax rates for 
OECD countries over the past quarter century.  As is clear from this diagram, the U.S. 
statutory corporate tax rate has been increasing relative to other OECD countries over the 
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previous 15 years, and it is now one standard deviation higher than the average OECD 
tax rate.3   
The U.S. government taxes U.S. multinational firms on a residence basis, and thus 
U.S. resident firms incur taxation on income earned abroad as well as income earned in 
the United States. This system is sometimes referred to as a credit system, as U.S. firms 
receive a tax credit for taxes paid to foreign governments.  The tax credit is limited to the 
U.S. tax liability although firms may generally use excess credits from income earned in 
high-tax countries to offset U.S. tax due on income earned in low-tax countries, a process 
known as cross-crediting. Taxation only occurs when income is repatriated.4  Thus, 
income can grow free of U.S. tax prior to repatriation, a process known as deferral.  
Deferral and cross-crediting provide strong incentives to earn income in low-tax 
countries. There is also typically an incentive to avoid income in high-tax countries due 
to the limited tax credit. 
 As an example, consider a U.S. based multinational firm that operates a 
subsidiary in Ireland.  Assume that the U.S. corporate income tax rate is 35% while the 
Irish corporate income tax rate is 12.5%.  The Irish subsidiary earns ?800 and decides to 
repatriate ?70 of the profits to the United States.  (Assume, for ease of computation only, 
a 1:1 exchange rate.)   First, the Irish affiliate pays ?100 to the Irish government on 
profits of ?800.  It then repatriates $70 to the United States, using the remaining profit 
(?630) to reinvest in its Irish operations.  The firm must pay U.S. tax on the repatriated 
income, but it is eligible for a tax credit of $100 (taxes paid) times 70/700 (the ratio of 
                                                 
3 The trends for average effective tax rates are similar.  See Figure 1, panel B. 
4 The Subpart F provisions of U.S. tax law prevent some firms from taking full advantage of deferral.  
Under Subpart F, certain foreign income of controlled foreign corporations is subject to immediate 
taxation.  This includes income from passive investments.  
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dividends to after-tax profits), or $10.  This assumes that the U.S. multinational firm does 
not have excess foreign tax credits from its operations in high-tax countries;  if it does, it 
can use these credits to offset taxes due on the repatriated Irish profits.  Due to deferral, 
the remaining profits (?630) can grow abroad tax-free prior to repatriation.   
This system creates a clear incentive to earn profits in low-tax countries.  Firms 
may respond by locating real activities (jobs, assets, production) in low-tax countries.  In 
addition, firms respond by shifting profits to low-tax locations, disproportionate to the 
scale of business activities in such locations.  There are multiple ways to shift income 
among countries.  For example, it may be advantageous for multinational firms to alter 
the debt/equity ratios of affiliated firms in high and low-tax countries in order to 
maximize interest deductions in high-tax countries and taxable profits in low-tax 
countries.  Further, multinational firms have an incentive to distort the prices on intrafirm 
transactions in order to shift income to low-tax locations.  For example, firms can follow 
a strategy of under- (over-) pricing intrafirm exports (imports) to (from) low-tax 
countries,  following the opposite strategy with respect to high-tax countries.5  
In theory, firms should be limited in their ability to engage in tax-motivated 
transfer pricing by fear of detection.  Governments generally employ an “arm’s length” 
standard, requiring multinational firms to price intrafirm transactions as if they were 
occurring at arm’s length.  Nonetheless, there is universal agreement that this standard 
leaves substantial room for tax incentives to affect pricing, as arm’s length prices are 
often difficult to establish for many intermediate goods and services.  Further, as argued 
below, the arm’s length standard has become administratively unworkable in its 
                                                 
5 There are numerous other margins along which income shifting incentives influences multinational firm 
behavior, including the location of intangible property, the payment of royalties, and the timing and 
planning of repatriation decisions. 
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complexity.  As a result, the arm’s length standard rarely provides useful guidance 
regarding economic value. 
 Some countries (such as the U.K and Japan) use a tax credit system similar to that 
used by the United States.  Still, others (such as France and the Netherlands) exempt most 
foreign income from taxation;  this is referred to as a territorial system of international 
taxation.  In theory, multinational firms based in these countries have an even greater 
incentive to incur income in low-tax countries as such income will not typically be taxed 
upon repatriation.  Still, some authors argue that excess foreign tax credits and deferral 
blur the distinction between these two systems.6  
 Shortly before the 2004 election, the U.S. Congress passed the American Jobs 
Creation Act.  The international tax provisions of this law represent a somewhat subtle 
shift toward a territorial system of taxing international income in the United States.  For 
example, the legislation contained a provision to allow a temporary tax holiday for 
dividend repatriations of 5.25 percent;  this provided a substantial tax advantage to 
repatriate funds from low-tax countries in the year of the tax break.  
 On net, this holiday made investments in low-tax countries more attractive 
relative to the prior status quo, as there was now the promise of methods for repatriating 
profits without incurring large tax costs.  In addition, other measures of the legislation 
permanently lighten the taxation on foreign income, including provisions that facilitate 
cross-crediting as well as changes in the interest allocation rules.7  Recently, George Yin, 
                                                 
6 See, e.g., Altshuler (2000).  de Mooij and Ederveen (2003) find evidence in support of this view.  In 
addition, several countries have hybrid systems that lie in between these two systems;  for instance, foreign 
income may be exempt from taxation in the home country provided that the foreign country’s tax system is 
sufficiently similar to that in the home country. 
7 See Avi-Yonah (2005), Clausing (2005), and Fleming and Peroni (2004) for a more detailed discussion 
and analysis of these provisions. 
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the former chief of staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation, concluded that the 
American Jobs Creation Act indeed takes the U.S. system of taxation closer to a 
territorial system, and speculated that future tax policy could move further in that 
direction.8
Problems with the Current System of Corporate Taxation 
 The current system of corporate taxation has both conceptual and practical 
weaknesses.  First, the system is not suited to the global nature of international business.  
In particular, international production processes make the separate accounting (SA) 
system of assigning profit to specific geographic destinations inherently arbitrary.  
Further, the very nature of multinational firm operations generates additional profit over 
what would occur with strictly arms-length transactions between unaffiliated entities. 
Theories of multinational firms emphasize that they arise in part due to organizational 
and internalization advantages relative to purely domestic firms;  such advantages imply 
that profit is generated in part by internalizing transactions within the firm.  Thus, with 
firms that are truly integrated across borders, holding related entities to an “arms-length” 
standard for the pricing of intracompany transactions does not make sense, nor does 
allocating income and expenses on a country-by-country basis.  In fact, a very similar 
logic was behind the use of formulary apportionment (FA) for U.S. state governments;  
with an integrated U.S. economy, it does not make sense to attribute profits and expenses 
to individual states, nor to regulate transfer prices between entities of different states.   
Also, the current system is based on an artificial distinction among legal entities.  
For example, companies are taxed differently based on whether they employ subsidiaries 
or branches;  as one example, deferral of taxation on unrepatriated profits is allowed for 
                                                 
8 See Glenn (2004). 
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the former but not the later.  Recently, there has been an increasingly common use of 
hybrid entities (treated as subsidiaries by one country and branches by another) to 
achieve double non-taxation. 
Another related problem is that the current system is based on an increasingly 
artificial distinction between multinational enterprises whose parent is incorporated in the 
United States and those whose parent is incorporated elsewhere. The former, but not the 
latter, are subject to world-wide taxation with its attendant complexities (primarily the 
foreign tax credit and Subpart F). But in today’s world, this distinction is less and less 
meaningful as the sources of capital, location of R&D, location of production, and 
location of distribution of MNEs become increasingly globalized. The current distinction 
has led to a spate of inversion transactions, in which US-based MNEs formally shift the 
location of incorporation of their parent offshore without changing the location of any of 
their real business activities. Arguably, it has also encouraged takeovers of US-based 
MNEs by larger foreign-based ones who can benefit from territorial systems of taxation.  
 Second, as explained above, the current U.S. system of international taxation 
creates an artificial tax incentive to locate profits in low-tax countries, both by locating 
real economic activities in such countries and by shifting profits toward more lightly 
taxed locations.  It is apparent that U.S. multinational firms book disproportionate 
amounts of profit in low-tax locations.  For example, Figure 2 shows the top ten profit 
locations for U.S. multinational firms in 2003, based on the share of worldwide (non-
U.S.) profits earned in each location.  While some of the countries are places with a large 
U.S. presence in terms of economic activity (the United Kingdom, Canada, Germany, 
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Japan), seven of the top-ten profit countries are locations with very low effective tax 
rates. 
The literature has consistently found that multinational firms are sensitive to 
corporate tax rate differences across countries in their financial decisions. Estimates from 
the literature suggest that the tax base responds to changes in the corporate tax rate with 
an average semi-elasticity of about -2;  thus, countries with high corporate tax rates are 
likely to gain revenue by lowering their tax rate.9  One recent study suggests that 
corporate income tax revenues in the United States were approximately 35% lower due to 
income shifting in 2002.10
This problem has worsened as U.S. corporate rates have become increasingly out 
of line with other countries.  In the past twenty years, most OECD countries have 
lowered their corporate income tax rates, whereas U.S. rates have been relatively 
constant.  This increasing discrepancy between U.S. rates and foreign rates likely results 
in increasing amounts of lost revenue for the U.S. government due to strengthening 
income shifting incentives. 
Also,  the literature suggests a substantial real responsiveness to tax rate 
differences among countries, with average semi-elasticities of real activity with respect to 
the corporate income tax rate of about -2.11   These findings imply both less activity in 
United States and less tax revenue for the U.S. government.  However, the tax 
responsiveness of real activity is less immediately apparent in the data.  For example, 
Figure 3 shows the top ten employment locations for U.S. multinational firms in 2003, 
                                                 
9 See de Mooij (2005) for an overview of this literature. 
10 This estimate is from Clausing (2007b).  The calculation is based on a regression of U.S. multinational 
firm affiliate profit rates on tax rate differences across countries.  See Appendix A for more details. 
11 See de Mooij (2005). 
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based on the share of worldwide (non-U.S.) employment in each location.  The high 
employment countries are the usual suspects – large economies with close economic ties 
to the United States.  As the accompanying table indicates, tax rates are not particularly 
low for this set of countries.   
Third, the current system is absurdly complex.  As Taylor (2005) notes, observers 
have described the system as “a cumbersome creation of stupefying complexity” with 
“rules that lack coherence and often work at cross purposes.”   Altshuler and Ackerman 
(2005) note that observers testifying before the President’s Advisory Panel on Federal 
Tax Reform found the system “deeply, deeply flawed”, noting that “It is difficult to 
overstate the crisis in the administration of the international tax system of the United 
States.”   
 Fourth, particularly given the high U.S. corporate statutory tax rates, the U.S. 
corporate tax system raises relatively little revenue.  Figure 4 shows the evolution of 
government corporate tax revenues relative to GDP for OECD countries.  For most 
OECD countries, revenues have increased as a share of GDP even as corporate tax rates 
have declined;  the average OECD country receives 3% of GDP from corporate tax 
revenue by the end of the sample.  Most observers attribute this trend to a broadening of 
the tax base for many OECD countries during this time period.  For the United States, 
revenues are lower;  although they fluctuate with the cyclical position of the economy, 
they tend to be closer to 2% of GDP.  There are several plausible reasons for the lower 
amount of U.S. revenue, including the increasingly aggressive use of corporate tax 
 9
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shelters, a narrower corporate tax base, and stronger incentives for tax avoidance, which 
tend to increase as the U.S. tax rate is high relative to other countries.12
 
III.  A Proposal to Adopt Formulary Apportionment  
  Our proposal would address most of the aforementioned flaws with the current 
system of corporate taxation.  Under formulary apportionment (FA), tax liabilities would 
reflect truly globally integrated business, and they would not be dependent on artificial 
distinctions among legal entities.  Under FA, unlike separate accounting (SA), firms 
would have no incentive to shift income across countries, as tax liabilities would be based 
on total world income as well as the share of a firm’s sales that occur in each destination.  
Since there would be no tax savings associated with shifting income across countries, the 
overall incentive to locate real activities in low-tax countries would also be reduced. 
Further, absent income shifting, U.S. government revenues would be higher.  If 
the proposal offered here were implemented in a revenue neutral fashion, it would enable 
a substantial cut in the corporate income tax rate.  Since the proposed system could entail 
dramatic simplification and help finance a corporate tax rate reduction, there is 
justification for corporate support. 
How Would Formulary Apportionment Work? 
 Under formulary apportionment, a unitary business is defined based on whether 
the parent corporation exercises legal and economic control over its subsidiaries.  That 
unitary business is treated as a single taxpayer and its income is calculated by subtracting 
worldwide expenses from worldwide income, based on a global accounting system, 
                                                 
12 Auerbach (2006) also notes that there is a declining ratio of nonfinancial C corporation profits, although 
he notes that this is offset by an increasing average tax rate due to the increasing importance of tax losses. 
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without regard to legal distinctions among units. The resulting net income is apportioned 
among taxing jurisdictions based on a formula that takes into account various factors. 
Each jurisdiction then applies its tax rate to the income apportioned to it by the formula 
and collects the amount of tax resulting from this calculation.  
Our proposed system would utilize a sales based formula.13  In the experience of 
U.S. states,  income has been allocated to state jurisdictions using a variety of formulas. 
Historically, many US states have used the so-called “Massachusetts formula” which 
employs equal weights on property, payroll and sales.  For example, under an equal-
weighted formula apportionment system, tax liability to the U.S. government would be 
based on the U.S. tax rate times the fraction of worldwide profits that are attributed to the 
United States.  This fraction would be based on how much of worldwide economic 
activity (an average of sales, assets, and payroll shares) occurs in the United States. 
Observers have noted that a FA system creates an implicit tax on the factors used 
in the formula, thus discouraging assets and employment in high-tax locations.  This 
formula also leaves unresolved issues concerning the treatment of intangible property, 
how to value property, etc.  In part due to these concerns, we propose a far simpler 
formula, which would only consider the fraction of sales in each location.  Sales would 
be determined on a destination-basis, based on the location of the customer rather than 
the location of production.  We propose this destination-basis sales formula for several 
reasons;  alternative formulas are also discussed in Appendix B. 
                                                 
13 A similar proposal has been advocated by Durst (2007), who offers legislative language for 
implementing a formulary approach to corporate taxation.   He notes that technical barriers to adopting FA 
have been overstated;  defining a unitary group and establishing the destination of sales are both attainable 
objectives. 
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The key advantage of a sales-based formula is that sales are far less responsive to 
tax differences across markets, as the customers themselves are far less mobile than firm 
assets or employment.  Even in a high-tax country, firms still have an incentive to sell as 
much as possible.  In addition, if some countries adopt sales-based formulas, other 
countries will have an incentive to adopt sales based formulas as well in order to avoid 
losing payroll or assets to countries in which these factors are not part of the formula. 
The U.S. state experience reinforces the merits of this proposal. In recent years, 
many US states have shifted to a formula that double-weights the sales factor, often based 
on a desire to encourage exports out of state and discourage imports.  State incentives to 
move toward a sales-based formula are well documented.  For example, Edminston 
(2002) generates a model with this prediction, and Omer and Shelley (2004) document 
this trend empirically.  Goolsbee and Maydew (2000) demonstrate that U.S. states that 
lower the weight on the payroll factor experience increases in manufacturing 
employment.  According to Weiner (2005), 23 states double weight sales as of 2004, and 
7 others have an even larger weight on sales.  Some states even use a sales-only formula 
(which was approved for Iowa by the Supreme Court).   
In addition, international experience suggests that movement toward a sales-based 
formula is likely.  Because of the widespread belief that imposing taxes on imports and 
exempting exports boosts national competitiveness and reduces trade deficits, it is 
possible that if some countries were to adopt a sales-based formula for apportioning 
corporate income, other countries would follow suit.  It would also be in these countries’ 
economic interest to avoid the implicit tax on assets and payroll that is embedded in a 
 12
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three-factor formula.14  This built-in incentive for sales-based formulas would minimize 
the likelihood of over or under-taxation due to disparate formulas, an obstacle to adopting 
formulary apportionment.  Still, it would be ideal to have international cooperation and 
consensus regarding both the adoption of FA and the choice of formula. We will discuss 
below the problems that arise if only the US were to adopt FA, or if different countries 
use different formulas.  
Five Key Advantages to Formula Apportionment 
 The first advantage associated with this proposal is that it would align the United 
States corporate tax system with the reality of a truly global world economy.  In a world 
where most major corporations are multinational firms, where 70% of U.S. international 
trade is done by multinational firms, and where many opportunities for tax avoidance 
have an international dimension, the current U.S. system of corporate taxation is obsolete.   
In particular, separate accounting (SA) systems treat each affiliate of a multinational firm 
as a distinct entity with its own costs and incomes.  Allocating income and expenses 
across countries is both complex (an issue discussed below) and conceptually 
unsatisfactory, given that worldwide income is generated by interactions between 
affiliates across countries.  Multinational firms exist in large part because these 
interactions generate more income than would separate domestic firms interacting at 
arms-length;  thus, requiring firms to allocate this additional income among domestic tax 
bases is necessarily artificial and arbitrary, because it would by definition disappear if the 
related entities operated at arm’s length.  Further, such allocation generates ample 
                                                 
14 In the last 50 years, over 100 countries have adopted the VAT, and every single one of them (including 
all other members of the OECD) has adopted the destination principle (i.e. imposing VAT on imports and 
rebating it on exports).  The spread of destination-based VATs around the world provides a good example 
of how tax innovations can spread without a coordinating supra-national agency or “world tax 
organization,” simply on the basis of countries’ perception of their self-interest. 
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opportunity for multinational firms to reduce worldwide tax burdens by shifting income 
to more lightly taxed jurisdictions, an issue that will be returned to below. 
 Under a FA system, tax liabilities are instead based on a multinational firm’s 
global income, and the share that is taxed by the national jurisdiction depends on the 
fraction of a firm’s economic activity that occurs in a particular country.  In the case of a 
sales based definition, the measure of economic activity is sales, which focuses on the 
demand side of market value.  One could argue that a three-factor formula would also 
take into account the supply side of economic activity (with payroll and assets 
representing the capital and labor inputs into the production process), but we feel that the 
disadvantages of adopting a three-factor formula outweigh this conceptual advantage.15   
Thus, while a truly precise definition and measurement of economic value is 
likely unattainable, FA provides a reasonable, administrable, and conceptually satisfying 
compromise that suits the nature of the global economy.  Further, a FA system does not 
create an artificial legal distinction among types of firms, and whether multinational 
entities are organized as subsidiaries, branches, or hybrid entities. Nor does an FA system 
rely on an artificial distinction between MNEs whose parent is incorporated in the United 
States and MNEs whose parent is incorporated elsewhere.16  
The second advantage associated with the proposal is that it eliminates the tax 
incentive to shift income to low-tax countries.  As income shifting incentives are an 
important part of the overall tax incentive for locating operations in low-tax countries, 
removing this incentive will also result in less tax-distorted decisions regarding the 
                                                 
15 See Appendix B for more discussion of alternative formulas. 
16 If a sales-based formula is adopted, both US and foreign-based MNEs would be able to locate their 
headquarters (which frequently produce positive externalities, such as those that flow from R&D) in the 
United States without increasing their tax burden. 
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location of economic activity.  Under FA, firms are taxed based on their global income.  
Thus, accounting for the income earned in each country is no longer necessary, and there 
is no way to lighten global tax burdens by manipulating this accounting for tax purposes.  
Since the share of global income that is allocated to each country under FA depends on 
the share of a multinational firm’s sales that are in each country, there would be some tax 
incentive to distort the location of sales among markets.  However, this could be 
combated by basing the sales definition on a destination principle, and in general, firms 
have an incentive to encourage sales in each market in order to serve the customers there. 
Under FA, there is no reason for the sort of profit distortions that are so clearly 
visible in Figure 2.17  In addition, when firms consider the tax advantages associated with 
operating in low-tax countries, these advantages will be based simply on the lower tax 
associated with their sales in such countries, rather than additional advantages conferred 
due to the fact that real operations in low-tax countries facilitate tax avoidance.  Thus, the 
adoption of FA should vastly reduce tax distortions to multinational firm decision 
making.  Also, it is important to note that, despite the emphasis on the sales of MNEs in 
different countries, this remains a corporate income tax, not a consumption tax.  For 
example, tax liabilities do not arise unless a multinational firm is earning profits 
worldwide, irrespective of their sales. 
Even though a unilateral move toward FA creates large incentives for other 
countries to adopt FA, and in particular sales-based formulas, such changes in the 
taxation of international income ultimately help governments set their tax policies more 
independently.  The wishes of voters in each government influence the ideal size of 
government, required revenue needs, and the allocation of the tax burden among 
                                                 
17 A very similar pattern is apparent in other years.  The BEA data are discussed further in Appendix A. 
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subgroups within society.  Under FA, governments would be able to choose their own 
corporate tax rate based on their assessment of these sorts of policy goals, rather than the 
pressures of tax competition for an increasingly mobile capital income tax base. 
The third advantage associated with the proposal is the massive increase in 
simplicity that this would enable for the international tax system.  If FA were adopted by 
our major trading partners, simplification gains would be particularly large, but 
simplification would still exist even if FA was adopted unilaterally.  To determine U.S. 
tax liability, there would be no need to allocate income or expenses among countries, 
resulting in far lighter compliance burden for firms.  Subpart F and the foreign tax credit, 
which are both hugely complicated and a major source of transaction costs for US-based 
MNEs, are no longer necessary, since there is no deferral under this system (which is 
essentially territorial and treats US- and foreign-based MNEs alike).   
Further, the likely administrative savings from abandoning the current 
cumbersome transfer pricing regime are huge. The current regime consumes a 
disproportionate share of both IRS and private sector resources.  For example, several 
recent Ernst and Young surveys of multinational firms have concluded that “transfer 
pricing continues to be, and will remain, the most important international tax issue facing 
MNEs”.   (Ernst and Young, 2006)  70% of their respondents feel that transfer pricing 
documentation has become more important in recent years, and 63% of respondents 
report transfer pricing audit activity in the previous three years.  (Ernst and Young, 
2005).  For the government, audit costs are several (three to seven) times higher for 
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federal transfer pricing cases than for state formula apportionment audits, even in the case 
where the most efficient federal cases are compared to the least efficient state ones.18
Opinions in transfer pricing cases run to hundreds of pages each, and litigation 
involves billions of dollars in proposed deficiencies, such as the recently settled Glaxo 
case ($9 billion in proposed deficiency, settled for $3.4 billion) or the Aramco advantage 
case (litigated and lost by the IRS, which asserted deficiencies of over $9 billion).  There 
is no indication that the 1994 regulations under IRC section 482 have abated this trend 
(Avi-Yonah, 2006). While there have been fewer decided cases than under the pre-1994 
regulations, this is because both taxpayers and the IRS have been devoting enormous 
resources to settling these controversies in the appeals process, in litigation or through 
advance pricing agreements, while both sides have been wary of losing a major court 
case.  
The contemporaneous documentation rule adopted by Congress, which requires 
taxpayers to develop documentation of their transfer pricing methods at the time the 
transactions are undertaken rather than when they are challenged on audit, as well as the 
complexity of the new SA methods (such as the Comparable Profits Method, or CPM), 
have led the major accounting firms to develop huge databases and expertise in preparing 
transfer pricing documentation for clients. This imposes large costs on major US 
multinational corporations (Durst and Culbertson, 2003).  Meanwhile, small and medium 
businesses, which cannot afford the major accounting firms, are left to fend for 
themselves and are frequently targeted for audits in which the IRS can employ more 
sophisticated methods than the taxpayer because only the IRS and the large accounting 
firms have the necessary data to apply CPM. Thus, while the IRS continues to lose 
                                                 
18 See Bucks and Mazerov (1993). 
 17
18
Law & Economics Working Papers Archive: 2003-2009, Art. 70 [2007]
http://repository.law.umich.edu/law_econ_archive/art70
transfer prices cases against major MNEs under the 1994 regulations (e.g., Xilinx) or has 
to settle for less than half the proposed deficiency in Glaxo, it is able to win cases against 
small and medium firms on the basis of superior resources, rather than greater substantive 
justification of its position.  
By contrast, FA is relatively simple since all that it requires is (1) establishing 
which businesses are unitary (discussed below) and (2) establishing destination of arm’s-
length sales of goods or services. Once these two elements are established, the resulting 
formula permits both taxpayers and the IRS to determine to correct tax liability to each 
jurisdiction that uses FA. This means that there is no longer a need to allocate or 
apportion expenses (a source of major complexity in the current rules, as the 861 
regulations indicate), because all a business needs is to calculate its world-wide net 
income (worldwide gross income minus worldwide expenses). This net income is then 
allocated to various jurisdictions based on a single formula, the tax rate of each 
jurisdiction is applied to the allocated income, and the tax is paid.  
For small and medium businesses in particular, FA results in major cost savings 
as well as the likelihood of paying less tax (since such businesses are rarely in a position 
to take on the IRS under SA).  For major multinational firms, FA also offers the prospect 
of avoiding the costs of contemporaneous documentation, and while some firms may pay 
more tax than under SA, many would welcome the opportunity of paying a single, low 
rate to each jurisdiction they do business in (especially if the adoption of FA is coupled 
with a reduction in the corporate rate), instead of having to cope with the complexities 
and costs of SA.  Of course, some firms will also be hurt by the change in tax 
environment;  these issues are discussed below, at the end of Section IV.     
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The fourth advantage associated with the adoption of FA for the United States is 
that the new system would either raise more revenue or enable a substantial rate 
reduction.  Estimating exactly how much revenue such a change would raise is a difficult 
and imprecise task, and the details of the implementing legislation and regulations would 
likely be influential in determining the ultimate effects of the proposed change.  Still, 
previous studies and back-of-the-envelope calculations suggest that such a change is 
likely to generate substantial additional U.S. government revenue.  
 Appendix A reviews several such calculations in more detail.  For example, one 
recent study finds that tax avoidance activities reduce income earned in the United States 
by U.S. multinational firms by over $150 billion in 2002, resulting in corporate tax 
revenues that are about 35% lower.  Since FA would eliminate tax avoidance incentives, 
one would expect it to raise revenues by a similar margin.   
The most thorough estimate to date is Shackleford and Slemrod (1998);  they use 
accounting data in financial reports for 46 U.S. based multinational corporations over the 
period 1989 to 1993 to estimate changes in revenue under a three-factor FA system.  
They find that U.S. government revenues would increase by 38%.  This increase is not 
dependent on any particular factor, and they calculate that a single factor sales formula 
would increase revenues by 26%.  Given the changes in the international tax environment 
since the time period of their data, and in particular the increasing discrepancy between 
the U.S. corporate tax rate and those of other major countries, these estimates likely 
understate the current U.S. revenue gain with FA adoption.    
Table 1 shows illustrative statistics on the operations of U.S. multinational 
affiliates in 2003 for all countries where the Bureau of Economic Analysis reports data 
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and where affiliate operations are at least one half of one percent of world-wide totals in 
either sales or income.  Column (1) shows the share of worldwide foreign affiliate sales 
that occur in each country, column (2) shows the share of worldwide affiliate net income 
earned in each country, column (3) shows the effective tax rate, and column (4) shows 
the percentage by which the income share exceeds or falls short of the sales share.   
Countries are shown in the descending order of values for column (4), and it is 
immediately apparent that those countries with income shares that vastly exceed their 
sales shares tend to be very low-tax countries, and those with sales shares that exceed 
their income shares are typically high-tax countries.  Thus, it appears quite likely that a 
sales-based formula apportionment system would increase revenues in comparatively 
high-tax countries, decreasing them in low-tax countries.    
 As one plausible conjecture, if revenues increase by 35% with formula 
apportionment, one can also calculate the tax rate reduction that would be possible with a 
revenue-neutral implementation of  FA.  In that case, the implied new corporate tax rate 
would be 26%, nine percentage points lower than the current corporate tax rate of 35%.  
Of course, one could also pursue an intermediate policy that allowed a smaller rate 
reduction and also increased revenues more modestly.  Appendix A provides more 
background on these calculations. 
 Therefore, adoption of FA can help address the four flaws in the current system of 
U.S. taxation that were discussed in Section II of the paper.  There are also potential 
gains due to coordination with other taxes as well as coordination among countries.   
Consider first coordination with value added taxes.  Existing VATs around the world 
depend of defining the destination of sales of goods and services. Determining 
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destination for goods is relatively easy because of customs enforcement.  In fact, many 
jurisdictions use harmonized rules for customs, VAT and income tax collection. 
Determining destination for services is harder, but countries have developed significant 
expertise in it under VAT. If the United States adopts sales-based FA, it can learn from 
this experience even without adopting its own VAT. If the US subsequently adopts a 
VAT, the existing rules for determining sales destination under FA can be coordinated 
with the VAT rules. In addition, existing US regulations already define destination and 
origin of goods for purposes of trade regimes, tax-based export subsidies, and under the 
base company rules of Subpart F, and any FA regime can build on this expertise as well. 
This proposal also introduces the possibility of gains from coordination with other 
countries. The EU Commission is actively working on defining a common tax base and 
apportioning it among member states by formula.19  We can learn from this effort (which 
itself learned from the US state and Canadian province experiences).20  Also, if the 
United States and the European Union both adopt FA, there is obvious potential for 
coordinating their efforts through the OECD. It may in fact be possible, given current 
discussions of FA within the EU, to reach agreement with the EU (and possibly with 
other OECD members) on the adoption of FA before it is actually implemented.  
Still, while an international agreement would be ideal, we do not believe that 
reaching such an agreement should be a necessary prerequisite to the United States 
adopting FA unilaterally. Many significant advances in international taxation, such as the 
                                                 
19 Gnaedinger and Nadal (2007) report that EU Tax Commissioner Kovacs is optimistic that the common 
consolidated corporate tax base would move forward, despite the opposition of a minority of EU member 
governments.  If a member country vetoes the draft legislation, the EU may turn to the “enhanced 
cooperation procedure” through which action can still proceed.  Kovacs described a timeline through which 
the common tax base could be in place as soon as 2010. 
20 See Weiner (2005). 
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foreign tax credit and CFC regimes, as well as more problematic developments such as 
the current transfer pricing methods, resulted from unilateral action by the United States, 
which was followed by most other jurisdictions and by the OECD. 
 
IV. Downsides of Formulary Apportionment 
This section of the paper will consider potential drawbacks associated with this 
proposal.  The concerns fit into four broad categories.  First, some critics argue that FA is 
inherently arbitrary.  Second, there are implementation issues associated with the 
definition of a unitary business and the determination of the location of sales.   Third, 
there are problems associated with interactions between countries with incongruent 
corporate tax systems.  There is a potential for zero or double taxation, accounting 
standards across countries are not uniform, tax treaties may need modification, revenues 
may systematically shift away from some countries, and there may be issues of 
compatibility with WTO obligations.  Finally, the proposed FA system is likely to 
negatively impact some stakeholders, as some domestic industries and firms will find that 
their tax obligations increase under the new system. 
Is Formulary Apportionment Arbitrary? 
Some would consider basing the corporate income tax liability solely on the 
extent of sales in a particular country to be arbitrary.  Indeed, this approach focuses on 
the demand side of the value created by the corporation.  For example, the market 
jurisdiction would levy the entire corporate income tax in the case of a MNE that 
produces in one country and sells in another.  Still, it is not clear that the current SA 
regime is less arbitrary given the incentive to shift profits to low-tax jurisdictions.  
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Under the current regime, it is quite possible that a MNE will not pay taxes either 
in the location of production (because of tax competition and production tax havens) or in 
the location of distribution (because it can avoid having a permanent establishment or 
minimize the profits attributable to the distribution function), while any tax due to its 
residence jurisdiction are subject to deferral or exemption. Such a result is more arbitrary 
than consistently assigning profits to the market jurisdiction, especially if most countries 
adopt the same formula.21  
It is true that any formula can produce arbitrary results in a given industry. For 
example, the oil industry has long argued that it is unfair to tax it based on payroll, assets 
or sales because most of its profits result from the oil reserves themselves, which are not 
reflected in the formula (since they are typically not assets of the company for any length 
of time).  However, while some industries will lose under the proposed formula, others 
(such as major US exporters) will win, and most taxpayers would gain from the increased 
simplicity and transparency of the FA regime. If companies are willing to pay one level 
of tax and are only concerned about double taxation, they should be willing to accept the 
FA option, which prevents double taxation but also double non-taxation.22
Implementation Issues 
 1. Defining a Unitary Business and the Destination of Sales 
                                                 
21 In fact, it is likely that a high proportion of current corporate tax collections come from taxing 
distribution activities that rise over the permanent establishment threshold (or are conducted in a separate 
subsidiary), given the ubiquity of targeted tax incentives for production activities. This explains why there 
is so much current pressure on the definition of permanent establishment (LeGall, 2006). Thus, other than 
reducing distortions, our proposal is a less radical shift from current reality than it appears to be from a 
theoretical perspective. 
22 It can also be argued that ignoring intangible property, which is the source of most of the value added by 
MNEs, is arbitrary under both our formula and the state formulas (that do not include intangibles in the 
property factor). But intangibles do not have a real location, and their value inheres in the whole MNE, 
which is why they cannot be adequately addressed under SA. Any formula that ignores intangibles assigns 
their value to the entire MNE (divided based on the other factors used in the formula), and we believe this 
result more accurately reflects the nature of intangibles. 
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 First, a difficult implementation issue in adopting FA is how to define a unitary 
business. Current IRC 482 (implementing SA) merely requires direct or indirect control 
among related parties, without even a precise definition of what control requires such as 
is found in other IRC provisions. However, for purposes of FA, mere control is not 
enough since in the absence of unitary business activities (i.e., an integrated MNE), FA 
can lead to significant distortions in the way a business operates (lumping together 
disparate sales from different businesses). In addition, relying solely on control would 
violate tax treaties that require something more for a subsidiary to be an agent of the 
parent. 
 We would suggest a test of unitary business that depends on whether the 
subsidiary in fact operates under the legal and economic control of the parent.23 Such a 
test would look at factors like where overall business strategy is set, the extent to which 
risk of loss is shared, and the extent to which there are transfers of goods and services 
among the constituent units of a MNE. In most modern MNEs, the level of integration is 
sufficient to find a unitary business, as the experience of the states in administering this 
test has shown. About 40% of all U.S. international trade takes place between affiliates of 
MNEs, suggesting the extent to which they are integrated. Moreover, the underlying 
transfer pricing problem depends on transactions among constituent parts of an MNE, so 
relying on such transactions as the basis for finding that a unitary business exists is 
appropriate to address the problem.24  Imposing a rebuttable presumption of control 
                                                 
23 This definition tracks the requirement for finding that a subsidiary is a dependent  agent of the parent 
under tax treaties, discussed below. 
24 If a MNE has several lines of business that are truly not related to each other (e.g., GE’s financial and 
non-financial businesses), FA should be implemented for each one separately. While this raises some 
definitional issues as well as the possibility of having to apply SA-based transfer pricing to any transactions 
between such lines of business, these problems should be far narrower in scope than those raised by the 
current system. 
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whenever there is a combination of legal control (i.e., ownership of over 50% of the stock 
by vote or value, with the usual attribution rules) plus some de minimis level of inter-
MNE transactions should go a long way to prevent tax-motivated attempts to break 
control.  
 While it is possible that taxpayer may try to avoid taxation by using 
“independent” distributing agents for their sales, it is unlikely that they would be willing 
to relinquish real control over their marketing and distribution activities, since that is why 
they are organized in MNE form in the first place (otherwise they could begin operations 
in a foreign country by selling through independent distributors, which is usually less 
costly). In addition, we would adopt a look-through rule that would regard any sales 
made by a MNE to an unrelated distributor as sales made into the U.S. if the distributor in 
fact sells the goods into the U.S. and does not substantially transform them before they 
are resold.25 This would prevent MNE from avoiding tax by selling their goods into the 
U.S. via unrelated “strawmen” who would themselves have minimal profits.26
Second, implementing a sales-based formula depends on the ability of tax 
administration to determine the destination of sales of goods and services.   This issue 
also arises under VATs and state income and sales taxes. In general, for a country like the 
US that maintains customs controls, establishing the destination of goods is not a 
significant problem, and is already the basis of several Internal Revenue Code 
provisions.27 The destination of services poses more difficult issues, but these problems 
                                                 
25 The substantial transformation test can be based on current Treas. Regs. 1.954-3(a)(4). 
26 Since we ignore intra- MNE sales, the MNE cannot engage in “round tripping” transactions in which it 
exports goods and then re-imports them into the U.S. 
27 See, e.g., Treas. Reg. 1.954-3(a)(3) (the base company sales rule), as well as the various export-related 
rules (IRC secs. 941-943, 970-971, 991-994), all of which rely on establishing the destination of goods 
sold. 
 25
26
Law & Economics Working Papers Archive: 2003-2009, Art. 70 [2007]
http://repository.law.umich.edu/law_econ_archive/art70
also arise under a VAT and have in general been treated successfully. For business to 
business provision of services (which covers the majority of services to unrelated 
parties), a rule that the destination of services is the jurisdiction in which the receiving 
business takes a deduction for payment to the service provider should establish the 
destination of the service.   
2. Interactions Between Countries with Different Tax Systems 
It would be ideal for most major countries to coordinate implementation of FA 
and to come to a joint agreement on the definition of the formula for apportioning global 
income.  Given that the European Union (EU) is already pursuing the possibility of FA 
within Europe,  a natural forum for reaching international consensus on these issues 
would be the OECD.  With international cooperation, the possibility of double or non-
taxation would be reduced and there would be less room for multinational firms to 
respond strategically to variations in country formulas.  
Moreover, one should note that unilateral adoption by the United States of a 
formula apportionment (FA) system for taxing international income would create a 
powerful incentive for other countries using separate accounting (SA) to also adopt FA.  
In a world with both FA and SA system countries, FA countries will immediately appear 
as tax havens from a SA country perspective.  For example, a multinational firm 
operating in SA and FA countries would have an incentive to book all their income in FA 
countries, as the tax liability in such countries does not depend on the income booked 
there, but rather the fraction of a firm’s activities in that location.  Such responses would 
likely greatly reduce the tax revenues of remaining SA countries.  Thus, SA countries 
will have a strong incentive to adopt FA, particularly if large economies adopt FA. 
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Moreover, the experience of the U.S. states amending their formulas to emphasize 
the sales factor, and the experience of over 100 countries adopting the destination-based 
VAT, suggests that there is a significant likelihood that if the U.S. were to adopt a sales-
based formula, other countries would be inclined to follow suit. The U.S. led the way in 
adopting the foreign tax credit (1918), Subpart F (1962), and the current transfer pricing 
regulations (1968 and 1994), all of which were followed by most of our major trading 
partners and recognized by the OECD. It is quite possible that if the U.S. adopted sales-
based FA, this would be another innovation that is widely copied, with or without explicit 
coordination.   
Still, if the United States adopts FA unilaterally and other countries do not follow 
suit (or follow suit much later), or if countries adopt different formulas, there is the 
potential for double or zero taxation. This is the largest obstacle to adoption of FA.  As 
argued above, there are built-in incentives for countries to respond to the other countries’ 
adoption of FA by themselves adopting FA, and there are also built-in incentives to move 
toward sales based formulas.  These incentives might help promote international 
cooperation in the initial negotiations regarding adoption and formula determination.  
Still, absent foreign adoption, problems of double or non-taxation may be particularly 
worrisome. 
Further, even if other countries eventually adopt FA, there will likely be a 
transition period while governments and multinational firms adapt to the new tax 
environment.  During this transition period, there may be problematic instances of 
double-taxation, and the firms that experience increased tax liabilities under FA may 
prove to be vocal critics of FA. 
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While situations of double taxation could arise, it is not clear that FA would 
produce more double taxation or double non-taxation that the current SA regime. As 
noted above, there is significant evidence that the SA regime results in under-taxation as 
MNEs succeed in shifting profits from high-tax to low-tax jurisdictions. However, SA 
can also result in double taxation to the extent that a high-tax jurisdiction successfully 
asserts that profits belong to it and not to another high-tax jurisdiction.  
For example, the IRS recently settled a major transfer pricing case with the British 
firm Glaxo for $3.4 billion. This additional revenue resulted from shifting to the US 
profits that Glaxo claimed belonged in the UK. It is far from clear that the UK tax 
authorities would accept the result of this settlement: Under the US-UK tax treaty, they 
are not required to do so. (Art. 9 of the treaty only states that a country must make a 
“correlative adjustment” when profits are shifted by the other treaty partner if it agrees 
that the profit shift was justified, which the UK seems unlikely to accept.) The dispute 
resolution mechanism in most of our tax treaties does not provide for binding arbitration 
and therefore does not necessarily lead to a resolution.  As Justice Brennan observed in 
the Container case (approving California’s application of worldwide FA to US-based 
MNEs), it is not clear which method (FA or SA) produces more over- or under-taxation, 
even when some countries use FA and the others use SA, or when different formulas are 
used. 
Fundamentally, the issue of double or under-taxation under SA and FA resolves 
to the incentives facing taxpayers and governments, and whether taxpayers or 
governments are better positioned to respond to such incentives. Under SA, taxpayers are 
able to achieve under-taxation by shifting profits to low tax locations, and governments 
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have an incentive to prevent that, but forty years of experience have shown that 
governments are slow, and that the SA rules are insufficient to deter taxpayers or to 
enable governments to collect the corporate tax due. Under a combination of FA and SA, 
double taxation can result, but the incentive is for the taxpayers to prevent that by shifting 
profits out of SA countries into FA countries, which will in turn incentivize governments 
to adopt FA. Finally, under FA double taxation can result if different countries have 
different formulas, but taxpayers can prevent it by shifting production factors out of 
countries that have production factor-based formulas. Since taxpayers are more nimble 
than governments, it would seem preferable if the goal is to prevent over- or under-
taxation to err on the side of temporary double taxation, which can be remedied by 
taxpayer action, rather than rely on governments to prevent under-taxation. 
3. Defining the Tax Base 
There are issues associated with the need for common accounting standards. Still, 
the unilateral adoption of FA by the United States need not require the US and other 
countries to have a common tax base. However, as noted above, the ideal situation would 
be for most countries to adopt FA using the same (sales-based) formula. For this purpose, 
a common definition of the tax base is needed, as currently advocated by the EU 
Commission. 
Such a common definition of the tax base (as opposed to harmonized tax rates, 
which are unlikely as well as undesirable) is plausible to achieve because MNEs already 
use uniform accounting for world-wide financial reporting purposes. Thus, it is quite 
possible to use financial reporting as the starting point for calculating the global profit of 
the MNE, to be allocated to jurisdictions based on the FA formula. While there are still 
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differences in accounting among countries, those are diminishing due to the spread of 
International Accounting Standards, which have been adopted in the EU and Japan. 
Alternatively, it may be possible to let each MNE use its home country accounting 
methods for calculating the global tax base (as suggested by the EU Commission for 
inter-EU purposes). In that case, US MNEs would be able to use US GAAP for tax 
reporting in the EU and Japan, rather than incurring the cost of producing two sets of 
financial reports under GAAP and IAS.  Many European MNEs support FA in the 
European Union precisely because of the cost savings involved. 
Such changes would also have the advantage of more closely aligning book 
income and tax income.  This could act a damper on both the underreporting of income 
for tax purposes as well as the overstatement of income for the purpose of signaling 
profitability to financial markets.28   
However, if coordination of the tax base with accounting-based measures were 
unachievable or undesirable, FA could also be implemented unilaterally by the U.S. using 
its definition of taxable income and applying it to the entire MNE. U.S.-based MNEs 
already have to calculate the earnings and profits of CFCs for purposes of Subpart F and 
the foreign tax credit, so the additional information required for unilateral adoption would 
not be over-burdensome. For non-U.S. based MNEs, we could use financial reporting to 
shareholders (already required by the SEC or by home country regulators) as the base for 
calculating worldwide income. While this would create a disparity between U.S. and non-
                                                 
28 This is discussed in Desai (2005), where he recommends reconsideration of the dual-reporting system.   
Desai (2003) reports an increasing divergence between book income and tax income, with more than half 
of the divergence not explained by conventional differences between the measures.  For the United States 
in 1998, he estimates that this discrepancy amounts to about 34% of tax income (just over $150 billion), 
and he attributes these trends to increased tax sheltering activities. 
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U.S. based MNEs, the result is similar to allowing MNEs to use their home state base for 
tax purposes, as recommended by the EU. 
 
4. Interaction with Tax Treaties 
Some have argued that tax treaties will need modification with adoption of 
formulary apportionment.  However, it is not clear that existing US tax treaties will have 
to be renegotiated. Transfer pricing is currently governed by Article 9 of the treaties, 
which assumes the SA method because it addresses the commercial or financial relations 
between associated enterprises. If FA were adopted, Article 9 would become irrelevant in 
those situations to which FA applies (i.e., where a unitary business is found to exist) 
because FA ignores the transactions between related parties, and treats them instead as 
part of a single enterprise. 
 Instead, FA would be governed by Article 7, which governs the relationship 
between a parent company and a branch (permanent establishment) or an agent. Under 
Article 5(7), “[t]he fact that a company that is a resident of a Contracting State controls or 
is controlled by a company that is a resident of the other Contracting State … shall not 
constitute either company a permanent establishment of the other.” However, it is well 
established that a dependent agent can be a permanent establishment (see Art. 5(5)), and 
whether an agent is dependent is based on whether the principal exercises legal and 
economic control over the agent. “An agent that is subject to detailed instructions 
regarding the conduct of its operations or comprehensive control by the enterprise is not 
legally independent.”29
                                                 
29 U.S. Treasury (2006), Art. 5(6).  
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 In the case of a modern, integrated MNE that operates as a unitary business, a 
strong argument can be made that the parent of the MNE exercises both legal and 
economic control over the operations of the subsidiaries, especially where the 
subsidiaries bear no real risk of loss and acquire goods and services exclusively or near 
exclusively from the parent or other related corporations. In that case, the subsidiaries 
should be regarded as dependent agents of the parent. Such a finding is in fact made with 
increasing frequency. (See LeGall’s (2006) discussion of recent cases from Germany, 
Italy and Canada, as well as from developing countries, and the Inverworld case in the 
US). 
 If the subsidiary is an agent of the parent, Art. 7(2) of the treaties requires the 
attribution of the same profits to the subsidiary “that it might be expected to make if it 
were a distinct and independent enterprise engaged in the same or similar activities under 
the same or similar conditions.”  Arguably, the application of FA, even when based on a 
sales only formula, satisfies this arm’s length condition because in the absence of precise 
comparables (which almost never exist) it is not possible to determine exactly what 
profits would have been attributable to the subsidiary under SA.  
 When the US adopted CPM and profit split in the 1994 transfer pricing 
regulations, some countries objected that it was violating the treaties because these 
methods did not rely on exact comparables to find the arm’s length price. However, these 
objections soon subsided, and even the OECD endorsed similar methods in its transfer 
pricing guidelines. The US always maintained that both CPM and profit split satisfy the 
arm’s length standard despite the lack of precise comparables (and in the case of profit 
split, using no comparables at all to allocate any residual profits). Similarly, the US has 
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maintained that the “super-royalty rule” of IRC sec. 482 (which requires royalties to be 
“commensurate with the income” from an intangible, and therefore subject to periodic 
adjustment) is consistent with the arm’s length standard, even though no comparables can 
be found to show that such adjustments are ever made by unrelated parties. 
 Thus, were the US to adopt FA, it could similarly argue that the resulting 
allocation of profits to the subsidiary is consistent with the arm’s length standard 
embodied in articles 7 and 9. Despite the OECD’s traditional hostility to FA, there is no 
way to prove in the absence of comparables that any profit allocation deviates from an 
arm’s length result. As stated in 1993 by senior officials of the United States Treasury, 
the United Kingdom Inland Revenue, the Fiscal Affairs Division of the OECD and the 
Japanese National Tax Administration: 
“[T]he arm's length principle and formulary apportionment should not be seen as 
polar extremes; rather, they should be viewed as part of a continuum of methods 
ranging from CUP to predetermined formulas. It is not clear where the arm's 
length principle ceases and formulary apportionment begins, and it is 
counterproductive and unimportant to attempt to apply labels to the methods.”30  
 
 Nevertheless, although the adoption of FA would not require renegotiating any 
US treaties, it would be a good idea for the US to explicitly sanction the use of FA in 
future treaty negotiations. This can be done by inserting in future US treaties the 
language of OECD Model Art. 7(4): 
“Insofar as it has been customary in a Contracting State to determine the profits to 
be attributed to a permanent establishment on the basis of an apportionment of the 
total profits of the enterprise to its various parts, nothing in paragraph 2 shall 
preclude that Contracting State from determining the profits to be taxed by such 
an apportionment as may be necessary; the method of apportionment adopted 
shall, however, be such that the result shall be in accordance with the principles 
contained in this Article.” 
 
                                                 
30 Arnold and McDonnell (1993). 
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This language is found in many existing tax treaties based on the OECD and UN models, 
and it can be used by the US as a basis for applying FA without resort to a treaty 
override. 
 There is one situation where existing treaties would prohibit application of FA 
based on sales, which is when a corporation is able to sell goods or provide services to a 
market without any kind of permanent establishment, directly or through an agent. This 
situation can arise in some cases of electronic commerce.31 However, the same problem 
arises also under SA, and countries in general have been able to avoid significant revenue 
losses by aggressive interpretation of the permanent establishment threshold, and because 
it is difficult as a business matter in most situations to avoid having any presence in the 
market jurisdiction. In the long run, we would support renegotiating the treaties to 
incorporate a modernized version of permanent establishment that does not depend on 
physical presence but rather on the volume of sales into a market jurisdiction, as is 
commonly done for VAT purposes (most VAT jurisdictions have de minimis rules for 
volume of sales).  
 5. Distributional Issues 
Revenues may systematically shift away from some countries under formulary 
apportionment.  The current tax haven countries would likely experience large reductions 
in revenues.  For example, Ireland and Luxembourg are both low-tax countries where 
disproportionate amounts of corporate income is earned, and in 2002, Ireland received 
3.8% of GDP from the corporate tax and Luxembourg received 6.2% of GDP, both well 
above the OECD average revenue share of 2.9%. 
                                                 
31 See, e.g., the recent state case involving MBNA, which applied an “economic nexus” theory in the 
absence of any physical nexus. 
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 Also, some have argued that a sales-based formula would benefit countries like 
the United States, which runs a large trade deficit, at the expense of countries with large 
trade surpluses.  However, the key determinant of which countries would gain or lose 
revenue is whether countries have disproportionately large or small amounts of local 
corporate sales relative to corporate income.  And, there is no evidence in the data that 
this factor is related to countries’ trade positions. 
 If one considers the operations of U.S. multinational firms and their foreign 
affiliates as a guide, it is quickly apparent that it is difficult to make regional 
generalizations about which countries will gain or lose.  For example, developing 
countries do not have systematically lower (or higher) levels of local affiliate sales 
relative to affiliate income in comparison with richer countries.  It appears, for example, 
that the ratio of local sales to corporate income for U.S. affiliates in African countries is 
quite similar to the world average.  Asian and Latin American countries actually have a 
higher ratio of local sales to corporate income than the world average, whereas European 
countries have a slightly lower ratio of local sales to corporate income.  In all cases, 
however, regional averages mask significant differences across countries.  In general, 
high-tax countries would likely gain revenue at the expense of low-tax countries 
following the adoption of FA, as high tax countries tend to have higher shares of local 
corporate sales relative to corporate income.   
This conclusion assumes widespread adoption of FA;  absent that, the remaining 
SA countries would also lose revenue as MNEs would have a strong incentive to book 
income in FA countries, since their tax liabilities in such countries would not be affected 
by this accounting.  Still, despite concerns about systematic revenue losses to some 
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countries, we believe that our proposal will eventually help many governments by 
eliminating incentives for tax competition.  
6. Interaction with WTO Rules 
Finally, some scholars have argued that the use of a sales-only formula by US 
states violates WTO rules against export subsidies, because they constitute an illegal 
border adjustment for direct taxes. In general, the WTO rules permit border adjustability 
for indirect taxes, but not for direct taxes. Although this line has been widely criticized as 
incoherent, it is embedded in the current WTO agreements. 
It is not clear that the adoption of a federal sales-only formula for income taxes 
would in fact be a WTO violation. It can be argued that the formula is not explicitly 
contingent on export performance, and that it only serves as a means for allocating the 
income tax base among jurisdictions, as opposed to exempting transactions that would 
otherwise be taxable (as in a VAT).  No WTO complaint has in fact been filed against the 
US on the state formulas, even though state taxes are subject to WTO constraints. 
Also, if the adoption of FA by the United States occurs alongside widespread 
adoptions at least among OECD member countries, it would seem plausible that the 
WTO rules (which are widely regarded as obsolete) can be renegotiated. In general, 
progress in the WTO is usually impeded if the US and other OECD members disagree 
(e.g., on agricultural subsidies), but not if they agree. As noted above, the EU 
Commission has already endorsed FA, and thus a challenge by the European Union is 
unlikely. 
If a country does successfully challenge the US over the adoption of sales-based 
FA, and the rules cannot be renegotiated, this might require changing the formula to one 
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based equally on assets and sales, which is not open to WTO challenges. However, this 
would come at a price of encouraging more artificial shifting of assets to low-tax 
jurisdictions, so we do not advocate it at present. 
Negative Effects on Some Corporate Stakeholders 
 Analysts have noted that adoption of FA would disproportionately affect some 
industries and firms negatively. For example, Shackelford and Slemrod (1998) find that 
FA raises tax liabilities for some industries and firms, lowering burdens for others.  They 
estimate that the oil and gas industry would see an increase in tax liabilities of 81% under 
FA, compared with 29% for all other firms in their study.  (The mean oil and gas 
company in their study reports 68% of assets in the United States, 70% of sales in the 
United States, and 78% of total compensation paid to U.S. employees, but such 
companies book 42% of pretax earnings in the United States.)  The authors also estimate 
that some firms will experience a tax decrease, including Boeing, Procter and Gamble, 
and Dow Chemical.  
Under our proposal, firms with a disproportionate amount of U.S. sales relative to 
U.S. income would see tax increases under FA, while those with relatively low U.S. sales 
compared to U.S. income (e.g., large exporters) would see tax decreases.  In addition, 
observers such as Durst (2007) note that intangible-intensive firms would likely be 
adversely affected by adoption of FA, as these firms have been particularly adept at 
lowering their tax burdens through careful tax planning under the current system.  
Still, negative impacts could be muted by several considerations.  First, firms will 
benefit from reductions in complexity and compliance burdens.  Small and medium size 
businesses should be particularly appreciative of such benefits.  Second, if FA is 
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accompanied by a reduction in the corporate income tax rate, which could prove quite 
substantial if FA is implemented in a revenue-neutral fashion, that would increase the 
number of firms benefiting from the adoption of FA.  A rate reduction would also appeal 
to those concerned that the US is losing competitiveness because of the current rate 
disparity. 
 
V. Conclusion  
Our proposal for the adoption of formulary apportionment for the U.S. taxation of 
corporate income responds to the reality of an increasingly global world.  Multinational 
firms have internationally integrated operations, and they are responsive to the incentives 
created by discrepancies among national tax policies.  A separate accounting system 
generates an artificial need to assign income and expenses by location, and this creates 
ample opportunities for tax avoidance.   
A formulary apportionment system would remove the complexities associated 
with sourcing income and expenses across locations, and it would eliminate the tax 
incentive to shift income to more lightly-taxed locations.  Absent tax incentives to shift 
income away from the United States, U.S corporate tax revenues would likely increase 
significantly.  If this proposal were implemented in a revenue neutral fashion, on the 
other hand, the corporate tax rate could be cut substantially.  Even a revenue-neutral 
implementation of FA would retain the simplicity and efficiency gains associated with 
the proposal. 
The common objections to FA appear surmountable.   We have argued that the 
FA system is less arbitrary than the current system and that implementation issues can be 
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overcome.  While it would be ideal to implement FA with international cooperation, there 
are also natural incentives within a FA system that encourage international adoption and 
formula harmonization.  Even absent international cooperation, problems of double 
taxation or double non-taxation need not be any larger than under the current SA system.   
Further, it is likely that FA would be compatible with current treaty and WTO 
obligations. 
We also maintain that U.S. adoption of FA would be preferable to the other 
suggested reforms.  First, consider a simple base-broadening, rate-lowering reform.  This 
would no doubt be an improvement relative to the status quo as a lower rate would reduce 
the tax incentive to earn income in foreign countries and other distortionary effects of the 
current tax system.  In addition, base-broadening would level the playing field among 
different corporate activities, reducing the deadweight loss associated with tax-induced 
modifications in financial or real behavior.32  Yet, while such a reform would be 
desirable relative to the status quo, it would fall short of the gains from Formulary 
Apportionment in terms of compatibility with the global economy, administrative 
simplicity, and the efficiency gains associated with eliminating income shifting 
incentives.   
Second, consider the “Simplified Income Tax Plan” suggested by the President’s 
Tax Reform Panel.  This plan would adopt a territorial system for U.S. multinational 
corporations, exempting foreign income of U.S. firms from taxation.  The report notes 
that this plan would create:  
                                                 
32 As just one example, the production income deduction in the recent American Jobs Creation Act creates 
an artificial incentive to engage in production activity or to relabel income as production income;  
eliminating such provisions would be beneficial to broader integrity of the tax system. 
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“more even treatment of cross-border investment by U.S. multinational 
corporations.  Under the new system, territorial taxation of active foreign income 
would be available to all U.S. multinational corporations, not just those that are 
able to ‘self-help’ themselves to this result or its functional equivalent.  The new 
system is designed to make U.S. businesses more competitive in their foreign 
operations, while reducing the extent to which tax planning allows some 
multinationals to achieve more favorable results than others.”33
 
Unfortunately, this proposal worsens many of the problems discussed above.  In 
particular, firms would have an even larger incentive to shift income to low-tax locations.  
Further, while a territorial system could be designed to be revenue-neutral, the past 
experience of OECD countries suggests that territorial systems raise less corporate 
revenue.34  In addition, there would be limited simplification gains in comparison with 
FA, as multinational firms would still be responsible for sourcing income and expenses 
across locations, and the territorial nature of the tax system would put even greater 
pressure on the transfer pricing rules, as the report itself notes.35  We would in fact argue 
that adopting FA is the only way to achieve territoriality for US-based MNEs without 
risking significant revenue losses, worsening income shifting incentives, and increasing 
the complexity of the U.S. international tax regime. 
 Third, compare adoption of FA to a proposal that would simply end deferral of 
taxation on foreign income for U.S. multinational firms.  One such proposal is discussed 
in Altshuler and Grubert (2006), as a “burden neutral worldwide taxation” plan.  Under 
this plan, all foreign income would be taxed currently, there would be no required 
allocation of expenses to foreign income, and at the same time the U.S. corporate tax rate 
would be lowered so as to keep the overall U.S. tax burden on foreign income the same.  
                                                 
33 See chapter 5 of President’s Tax Reform Panel report, page 105. 
34 See Clausing (2007a). 
35 The Tax Reform Panel also suggested a “Growth and Investment Tax Plan” that would use domestic 
consumption as a tax base.  While this plan has intriguing elements, it also raises broader issues than can be 
addressed in the scope of this paper.  
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This system would effectively end deferral for U.S. resident corporations, and thus 
dramatically reduce income shifting incentives.  The authors estimate that a burden-
neutral implementation of the proposal would entail a corporate tax rate reduction on 
foreign income to 28%.36  
Still, under their plan, income shifting incentives would not be completely 
eliminated, as foreign-based multinational firms would be largely unaffected.  This 
consideration could create a stronger tax incentive for changing ownership patterns.  For 
example, firms could undertake inversions, basing their parent company in a tax haven.  
In addition, income shifting incentives still exist for U.S. multinational firms with excess 
credits.37  
While all of these proposals have merits, they also illustrate the difficulties 
associated with the taxation of multinational firms in a globally integrated economy.  It is 
nearly impossible to eliminate the tax distortions associated with the location of 
economic activity and profits across national boundaries without a dramatic rethinking of 
the nature of corporate income taxation in the world economy.  We hope that this 
proposal contributes to that deliberation.
                                                 
36 Their estimates are based on tax return data for U.S. multinational firms from the Treasury Department.  
The estimates are “static estimates” that do not account for behavioral responses such as changes in income 
shifting behavior or reduced incentives to lower foreign taxes. 
37 The authors estimate that about 30% of foreign income would be earned by U.S. firms with excess 
credits under their plan.  For firms with excess credits, there would still be tax planning opportunities 
associated with moving income from high-tax to low-tax countries, and with shifting income out of the 
United States. 
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Figure 1, Panel A:  Statutory Corporate Tax Rates, OECD Countries, 1979-200438
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Panel B:  Average Effective Tax Rates, OECD Countries, 1982-2004 
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38 Statutory tax rate data are from PricewaterhouseCoopers, Corporate Taxes:  Worldwide Summaries.  
Effective tax rate data are calculated as foreign income taxes paid relative to net (pre-tax) income for U.S. 
affiliates operating in a particular country.  These data are from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA);  
they are discussed further in Appendix A. 
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Figure 2:  Where Were the Profits in 2003?  
(profits as a percentage of the worldwide total) 
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Country Effective Tax Rate
Netherlands 5.3% 
Ireland 6.1% 
Bermuda 1.7% 
United Kingdom 20.1% 
Luxembourg -1.8% 
Canada 23.5% 
Switzerland 4.5% 
Germany 8.2% 
U.K. Islands 1.3% 
Japan 36.9% 
 
Notes: In 2003,  majority-owned affiliates of U.S. multinational firms earned $326 billion 
of net income.  This figure shows percentages of the worldwide (non-U.S.) total net 
income occurring in each of the top-10 income countries. Thus, each percentage point 
translates into approximately $3.3 billion of net income.  Effective tax rates are 
calculated as foreign income taxes paid relative to net (pre-tax) income.  Data are from 
the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) web page;  2003 is the most recent year with 
revised data available.  The Bureau of Economic Analysis conducts annual surveys of 
Operations of U.S. Parent Companies and Their Foreign Affiliates.  These data are 
discussed in more detail in Appendix A. 
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Figure 3:  Where Were the Jobs in 2003? 
(employment as a percentage of the worldwide total) 
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Country Effective Tax Rate
United Kingdom 20.1% 
Canada 23.5% 
Mexico 34.8% 
Germany 8.2% 
France 25.1% 
Brazil 65.4% 
China 13.0% 
Australia 28.0% 
Japan 36.9% 
Italy 35.1% 
 
 
Notes: In 2003,  majority-owned affiliates of U.S. multinational firms employed 8.2 
million employees.  This figure shows percentages of the worldwide (non-U.S.) total 
employment occurring in each of the top-10 countries. Thus, each percentage point 
translates into approximately 82,000 jobs.  Effective tax rates are calculated as foreign 
income taxes paid relative to net (pre-tax) income.  Data are from the Bureau of 
Economic Analysis (BEA) web page;  2003 is the most recent year with revised data 
available.  The Bureau of Economic Analysis conducts annual surveys of Operations of 
U.S. Parent Companies and Their Foreign Affiliates. These data are discussed in more 
detail in Appendix A. 
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Figure 4:   
Central Government Corporate Tax Revenues Relative to GDP, OECD Countries 
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Note:  Corporate tax revenue data are from the OECD revenue statistics.  GDP data are 
from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators database. 
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Table 1:  U.S. Multinational Firm Operations in 2003 
     (for those countries with the largest U.S. affiliate operations) 
 
 
(1) 
 
Share of 
Sales 
(2) 
 
Share of 
Income 
(3) 
 
Effective 
Tax Rate 
(4) 
Excess Income 
Share  
(v. Sales) 
       
Luxembourg 0.3% 7.0% -2% 2,585%
Bermuda 1.4% 9.5% 2% 600%
Barbados 0.1% 0.6% 3% 324%
U.K. Islands 0.8% 2.9% 1% 246%
Portugal 0.3% 0.8% 6% 205%
Netherlands 4.4% 12.8% 5% 194%
Denmark 0.4% 1.0% 11% 150%
Ireland 3.9% 9.6% 6% 146%
Indonesia 0.4% 0.8% 40% 71%
Switzerland 4.3% 6.0% 5% 41%
Belgium 2.1% 2.1% 11% -3%
Hong Kong 1.9% 1.8% 9% -6%
Singapore 3.4% 2.7% 7% -19%
Norway 0.7% 0.6% 66% -23%
Spain 2.1% 1.6% 10% -24%
Taiwan 0.9% 0.7% 19% -27%
China 1.7% 1.1% 13% -33%
Sweden 1.7% 1.1% 20% -33%
Germany 7.6% 4.8% 8% -37%
Korea, Republic of 0.7% 0.4% 28% -39%
Thailand 0.7% 0.4% 39% -43%
United Kingdom 14.0% 7.8% 20% -44%
Malaysia 1.1% 0.6% 23% -48%
Australia 2.6% 1.3% 28% -48%
Japan 5.9% 2.8% 37% -52%
Mexico 3.9% 1.6% 35% -58%
France 5.2% 2.0% 25% -61%
Argentina 0.6% 0.2% 45% -64%
Italy 3.0% 1.0% 35% -66%
Brazil 2.2% 0.2% 65% -92%
 
Countries are selected for inclusion in this table if either their sales share or their income share exceeds one 
half of one percent of worldwide totals.  Data are from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) web page;  
2003 is the most recent year with revised data available.  The Bureau of Economic Analysis conducts 
annual surveys of Operations of U.S. Parent Companies and Their Foreign Affiliates. These data are 
discussed in more detail in Appendix A. 
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Appendix A:  Estimates of Revenue Gain Due to Formula Apportionment 
 
This appendix considers methods of estimating the revenue gain to the United States 
government due to formula apportionment.  All of these methods rely on multiple 
assumptions and simplifications.  The data are imperfect and incomplete.  Further, there 
are multiple margins under which this change would affect multinational firm behavior 
both in the United States and abroad, and there is substantial uncertainty regarding the net 
influence of these responses on government revenues.  Finally, the actual legislation and 
accompanying regulations implementing FA would matter a great deal in terms of 
ultimate effects on revenue. 
 
Therefore, all of these estimates should be treated with a great deal of caution, as a mere 
starting point for thinking about this question.  That said, estimates below paint a broadly 
consistent picture of large U.S. government revenue gains with the adoption of formula 
apportionment.  
 
1. The simplest estimate of the revenue gain relies on inferences from the U.S. 
Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) data regarding the operations of U.S. 
multinational firms.  According to 2003 data from the BEA, U.S. multinational 
firms earn 56.7% of their worldwide net income in the United States.  However, 
69.6% of worldwide sales for these firms occurs in the United States.  If the 
United States tax base were 69.6% of worldwide income, it would increase by 
$149 billion.  With the increment taxed at the marginal tax rate of 35%, that 
would generate $52 billion in additional revenue.  Since revenues from the 
corporate income tax in 2003 were $131.8 b, that represents an increase of 40%.  
The following Table shows the results of the same calculations for the three most 
recent years with available data.  2002, however, was likely an usual year, as net 
income in the United States was abnormally low in comparison with other years. 
 
 2002 2003 2004 
 
Fraction of World Sales in United States 
 
 
71.6% 
 
 
69.6% 
 
68.2% 
Fraction of World Income in United States 8.2% 
 
56.7% 56.0% 
Implied New Tax Revenue $79 billion 
 
$52 billion  $53 billion 
Implied New Tax Revenue as Share of 
Same Year’s Federal Corporate Tax 
Receipts 
54%  40%  28% 
 
 
If one assumes instead that the increment were taxed at the average tax rate that 
was paid on corporate profits, then this increase would be smaller.  Yet in other 
ways, this estimate represents an underestimate of the revenue gain since it 
includes only U.S. multinational firms.  Foreign-owned multinational firms with 
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affiliates in the United States would also face changes in their tax treatment that 
will increase revenues as long as the fraction of their worldwide sales in the 
United States exceeds the fraction of their worldwide income booked in the 
United States.  While this is not possible to ascertain given the absence of BEA 
data on foreign parent firms, profits do appear to be disproportionately low for 
these firms relative to their sales in the United States.  For example, in 2003, net 
income of U.S. parent multinational firms is 6.5% of their U.S. sales, while net 
income for U.S. affiliates of foreign parent firms is 1.4% of their U.S. sales.   
 
A final issue concerning these calculations is the possibility of double-counting in 
the BEA net income figures.  These figures include “income from equity 
investments”, some of which may be counted more than once if there are tiers of 
holdings within the same country.  Unfortunately, from existing BEA data, it is 
impossible to tell exactly how large this problem is, or how much this problem is 
correlated with the tax rate of the country in question.39  Using an alternative data 
series from the BEA on direct investment earnings, one can exclude all income 
from equity investments, but this too is conceptually inappropriate.  Still, I 
performed calculations that employed this series nonetheless.  To make the data 
comparable to net income, I adjusted for the fact that direct investment earnings 
were pro-rated to reflect the ownership stake of the U.S. parent, assuming an 
average ownership stake of 68.6% for all firms. (This was the average ownership 
stake in 2003.)  One finds a very similar fraction of worldwide income abroad, 
roughly 57% in both 2003 and 2004.   Estimates of revenue gain from FA are 
about a third smaller, due to some combination of a narrower definition of income 
as well as the elimination of any double-counting. 
 
2. Clausing (2007b) undertakes estimates of the revenue lost to the United States due 
to income shifting by U.S. multinational firms.  These are based on regressions 
that consider how profit rates (profit to sales ratios) depend on affiliate country 
tax rates.  For the decade 1995 to 2004, the regression results indicate that a tax 
rate one percentage point higher (relative to the United States) is associated with 
an affiliate profit rate .5 to .8 percentage points lower.  This result is used, 
together with information regarding profits and sales for each country and year, to 
calculate how profits would be different absent tax influences, and thus how 
revenue would be different in the United States absent income shifting.   
 
Results vary by year, by whether one employs a statutory or an effective tax rate 
in the regression analysis, and by the assumption regarding the U.S. tax rate that 
would apply to higher levels of income in the United States.  One representative 
calculation finds that in 2002, U.S. corporate profits would be $170 billion higher 
absent income shifting.  This additional profit generates $54 billion in tax 
revenue, assuming additional profits are taxed at an effective tax rate of 32%.   
                                                 
39 Using German data, Weichenrieder (2006) finds no relationship between the tax rates of host countries 
and more complicated ownership chains. However, other tax factors are important, including whether the 
investing country has a credit or exemption tax system. 
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Since corporate tax revenues in 2002 were $148 billion, this represents a 37% 
increase in tax revenue.   
 
Some estimates are lower or higher than this number.  For the years 2001 to 2004, 
the average estimate indicates an increase in revenue of 38%, assuming new U.S. 
profits are taxed at an effective rate of 32%.  Estimates are lower employing a 
statutory tax rate in the regressions (compared to an effective tax rate), and 
estimates are lower in 2001 or 2002 (compared to 2003 or 2004).  
 
While these calculations are intuitively plausible, several assumptions are 
embedded that could cause the results to be underestimates or overestimates.  For 
example, it is assumed that all profit shifting occurs between the United States 
and affiliate countries, rather than among affiliate countries.  This consideration 
would make this estimate of revenue gain too high.  Still, estimates consider only 
the activities of U.S. multinational firms;  this consideration would make this 
estimate too low, as foreign-based multinational firms likely engage in income 
shifting away from their United States affiliates.   
 
3. Other studies have generated estimates of a similar magnitude.  The most 
thorough estimate is Shackleford and Slemrod (1998);  they use accounting data 
in financial reports for 46 large U.S. based multinational corporations over the 
period 1989 to 1993 to estimate changes in revenue under a FA system.   
 
Their estimates are based on firm financial statements and the related income tax 
footnotes. Three certified public accountants interpreted each detailed disclosure. 
Both domestic and foreign taxable income were estimated as the sum of the 
current relevant tax provisions and credits divided by the relevant statutory tax 
rate;  worldwide income is then the sum of domestic and foreign income.  The 
U.S. tax liability under formula apportionment is then calculated as the product of 
worldwide taxable income, the formula for the fraction of income allocated to the 
United States, and the U.S. tax rate.  
 
The authors find that FA raises tax liabilities for some industries and firms, 
lowering burdens for others.  They estimate that the oil and gas industry would 
see an increase in tax liabilities of 81% under FA, compared with 29% for all 
other firms in their study.  They also estimate that some firms will experience a 
tax decrease, including Boeing, Procter and Gamble, and Dow Chemical.   
 
Overall, Shackleford and Slemrod (1998) find that revenues would increase by 
38% under a three-factor FA system.  This increase is not dependent on any 
particular factor, and they calculate that a single factor sales formula would 
increase revenues by 26%.  Given the changes in the international tax 
environment since the time period of their data, and in particular the increasing 
discrepancy between U.S. corporate tax rates and those of other major countries, 
these estimates likely understate the current U.S. revenue gain with FA adoption.  
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Any of the first three estimates can also be used to generate an estimate of what corporate 
tax rate would be associated with a revenue neutral implementation of formula 
apportionment.  Taking as one baseline that tax revenues would increase by 35% with 
formula apportionment, this implies that the corporate tax rate could be lowered by 9 
percentage points, to 26%.  Of course, one could also pursue an intermediate policy that 
lowered the corporate tax rate less but that also modestly increased tax revenue. 
 
Note that the estimates discussed above are based on book income figures, not tax 
income.  Numbers (1) and (2) utilize data from the BEA surveys on multinational firms;  
number (3) uses data from firm financial statements.  It would be preferable to utilize 
data on tax income, which is also presumably more responsive to tax incentives;  
however, this is not possible absent access to Treasury data.   Also note that none of these 
estimates address methods that firms utilize to lower their taxable income overall;  the 
focus is instead on the sourcing of income. 
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Appendix B:  Other Formula Choices 
 
Section III of the paper explains the merits of employing a sales-based formula rather 
than the traditional “Massachusetts formula” which is an equal-weighted average of sales, 
payroll, and asset shares.  A sales based formula has several advantages.  First, firms 
have little ability to undertake tax avoidance strategies with a destination-based sales 
formula, since firms have no control over where customers are located.40   Second, this 
avoids an implicit tax on payroll and assets, which can distort multinational firms’ 
investment and employment decisions.  Third, U.S. states have demonstrated a tendency 
to increase the sales weight over time, so adopting a sales based formula at the outset 
may encourage countries to adopt more uniform formulas. 
 
Still, multiple factor formulas have some advantages.  First, while the incidence of the 
corporate tax is a complex matter, beyond the scope of this paper, one advantage of the 
equal-weighted formula is that the incidence of the tax may be more ideal.  For example, 
some argue that the asset portion of the formula is particularly compatible with the desire 
to have the corporate tax be born by capital.  Second, some argue that a three-factor 
formula more adequately captures the supply side of the process that generates profit.  
Still, as was recognized as far back as Marshall (1890), value has its roots in both supply 
and demand factors, and trying to separate them is as futile as trying to determine which 
blade of the scissors cuts.  Third, to the extent that firms are able to manipulate the 
destination of their sales (which we deem unlikely;  see text), a multiple factor formula 
would make that type of avoidance more difficult.  Finally, to the extent that some 
countries view a sales-based formula as not suited to their interests, a formula with 
several factors could be viewed as a useful compromise. 
 
In addition to a sales-based formula and an equally-weighted formula, some have 
suggested a formula with a double weight on sales.  For example, Eichner and Runkel 
(2006) argue that such a formula would reduce the harmful effects of tax competition, as 
the fiscal externalities of corporate income taxation would be minimized.   
 
Sorensen (2004) and Agundez-Garcia (2006) have discussed the possibility of using 
industry or macro-based weights in these formulas.  Thus, a firm’s tax liability in a 
particular country would not depend on their own share of worldwide activity in the 
country, but rather on the industry-wide average of these shares.  If a firm is small 
relative to the industry, then its own decisions have little effect on where its tax liability 
is assigned, and firms have no incentive to distort their behavior.  However, this method 
has the downside of separating a firm’s activities from the jurisdictions in which it incurs 
taxation, which would likely prove too arbitrary.  In the extreme, if macro-weights were 
used, a firm’s tax liability in a given country would depend on, e.g., the size of that 
country in the world economy.  So if the United States were one quarter of the world 
economy, any firm with nexus in the United States would have a U.S. tax base equal to 
one quarter of their worldwide profits, even if the particular firm did 1% (or 99%) of their 
activity in the United States.   This would strike many as unduly arbitrary.  
                                                 
40 Of course this assumes that the definition of a unitary business is sufficient to prevent manipulation of 
the destination of sales.  This issue is discussed in the paper. 
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